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IMPEACHMENT OF ONE'S OWN WITNESS BY PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS UNDER THE FEDERAL
AND ARKANSAS RULES OF EVIDENCE
Samuel A. Perroni*
The Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magis-
trates' (Federal Rules) and the Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence2 (Arkansas Rules) have provided federal and state courts the
opportunity to begin a new approach to the law of evidence. This
approach is designed to improve the quality of justice dispensed in
our courts through clarification and codification of generally ac-
cepted rules of law. The most desirable rules of law have been
adopted where harmony among the courts did not exist, and trial
courts have been vested with necessary discretion to determine,
under the circumstances of each case, what evidence will assist the
trier of fact in ascertaining the truth.'
The focus of this article is Rule 607 of the Federal and Arkansas
Rules: its history and its application to the impeachment of one's
own witness by the use of prior inconsistent statements. The article
also discusses the requirements that restrict the substantive use of
prior inconsistent statements under Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) 5 and
* Lecturer in Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; Assistant United States Attor-
ney for the Eastern District of Arkansas; B.S., Illinois Wesleyan University, 1970; J.D.,
University of Arkansas School of Law, Little Rock Division, 1974. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and should not be construed as official positions of the U.S. Attorney's
Office.
1. Fed. R. Evid. (codified in 28 U.S.C. app. at 2312-74 (Supp. V 1975)).
2. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-1001 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
3. "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
Fed. R. Evid. 102; Ark. Uniform R. Evid. 102.
4. "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party
calling him." Fed. R. Evid. 607; Ark. Uniform R. Evid. 607.
5. Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
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Arkansas Rule 801(d)(1)(i).
1. History and Purpose of the Rule Against Impeaching One's Own
Witness
Professor Wigmore states that reliance by practitioners upon
prior inconsistent statements is a form of "empiric impeachment"
which has as its goal the identification of specific flaws in testimony
involving self-contradiction.7 This form of impeachment is "more
sought after or more relied upon" during the ordinary course of trials
than any other mode of impeachment, and its use is "purely empiric
or inductive in form." ' For example, if a witness to a homicide
asserts at the scene of the murder that he saw the defendant near
the victim with a pistol in his hand and then later testifies in court
that he didn't see him at all, it could be inferred by the trier of fact
that the witness is as likely to be wrong in the latter statement as
in the former. It may also be inferred that the witness is not worthy
of belief?
The impeachment process therefore acts to "neutralize" the
witness' trial testimony with the resultant credibility issue to be
determined by the trier of fact.10 However, until the Federal Rules
and the Arkansas Uniform Rules were enacted into law, practition-
ers were saddled with an antiquated rule which generally prohibited
impeachment of one's own witness by prior inconsistent statements.
Considering the length of the rule's existence," the frequency
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition ....
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A).
6. Rule 801. Definitions.-The following definitions apply under this Article:
(d) Statements Which are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is
(i) inconsistent with his testimony and, if offered in a criminal proceeding, was
given under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a . . .[deposition] ....
Ark. Uniform R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(i).
7. 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 874 (rev. ed. 1970).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 902 at 668. The question of whether the prior statement can be used to prove
that the defendant was indeed at the scene with gun in hand is discussed in part 3 of this
article.
10. See United States v. Michener, 152 F.2d 880, 885 n.5 (3d Cir. 1945).
11. Wigmore traces application of the rule back to the late 1600's in criminal trials and
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of its use, and the importance of the rule to the judicial process, it
is surprising to note that the history of the rule is obscure and is the
subject of debate among legal scholars.12 One treatise notes that the
rule evolved from the earliest modes of trial where the defendant
was required to bring a number of persons to swear on his behalf.
These persons were not "witnesses" as we know them today, but
were instead partisans who went to court literally to swear for their
party by taking a properly formed oath. 3 This early notion of a
"witness" continued as a custom far beyond the time when the
witness' function ceased to be that of oath-taker and became one of
testifier to fact. 4 As long as the partisan witness notion remained,
it was inconceivable that a party would dispute what his own wit-
ness had to say. 5 Consequently, a rule of law began to develop in
criminal trials that a witness could not be discredited by the party
calling him." The rule came to be received as a general proposition
in civil cases shortly thereafter 7 and appears to have become firmly
established in the common law near the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury.1
There were three primary reasons behind the rule prohibiting
the impeachment of one's own witness.' First, a "primitive notion"
existed which provided that a party was morally bound by the testi-
mony of his witness.2" Second, a party calling a witness to the stand
early 1700's in civil cases. The rule became firmly established after its use in the noted trial
of Warren Hastings. 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 896 at 659-60.
12. Id.; 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 607101] n.13 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Weinstein's Evidence].
13. 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 896. For a more detailed account of "oath-takers,"
see 1 id. § 8; 2 id. § 575; 7 id. § 2032 (3rd ed. 1940).
14. 3A Wigmore, supra note 7, § 896 at 659.
15. Id.
16. 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 897 n.4 (citing Fitzharris' Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 223,
369, 373 (1681); Colledge's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 549, 636 (1681)). Until the late 1600's a
criminal defendant possessed no legal right to call witnesses; therefore, the prosecution was
not restrained by any rule against impeachment. 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 896 at 660.
Where the rule began to be enforced, the prosecution was still exempt. See, e.g., Lord
Mohun's Trial, 12 How. St. Tr. 949, 1007 (1692); Plunket's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 447, 470
(1681).
17. 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 896 at 660. (citing Adams v. Arnold, 12 Mod. 375
(K. B. 1700); Rice v. Oatfield, 2 Str. 1095 (K. B. 1738)).
18. See Warren Hastings' Trial, Lords' Journal, Feb. 9, April 10, 31 Parl. Hist. 369
(1788); Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U. Chi. L. Rev.
69 (1936).
19. McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 38 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as McCormick]; 3 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 607[01]; 3A J. Wigmore,
supra note 7, §§ 897-99; Ladd, supra note 18, at 76.
20. 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 897. In the early 1800's, however, courts were
observing the falsity of this notion. Id. (citing Whitaker v. Salisbury, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 534,
545 (1834): Brown v. Bellows. 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 179, 194 (1826)).
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was thought to guarantee or vouch for the witness' credibility."
Third, it was reasoned that a party ought not to have the ability to
coerce his witness into testifying as desired.2 These policy reasons
produced corollary issues which were difficult to resolve in a manner
that furthered the administration of justice. Since the focus of the
rule was primarily directed against character evidence, it appears
that the real danger involved in impeaching one's own witness by
prior inconsistent statements was that this type of impeaching evi-
dence might be taken by the jury as substantive evidence. In all
likelihood it was this risk which perpetuated the use of the rule.
Notwithstanding the foregoing policy considerations, several juris-
dictions through statute2 or court decision 6 began to develop inde-
pendent attitudes toward impeachment through the use of prior
21. McCormick, supra note 19, § 38; 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 898 (citing Pollock
v. Pollock, 71 N.Y. 137, 152 (1877); S. Greenleaf, Evidence § 442 (12th ed. 1866). Wigmore
rejected this reason as unsound and stated that "[a] court which allows the party to disprove
what his witness has said, and at the same time speaks of a guarantee of credibility as the
reason for some other part of the rule [that one cannot impeach his own witness], refutes
itself .... " 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 898. The "voucher rule," as it came to be known,
was put to rest in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
22. 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 899 at 663. This reason was classified by Wigmore
as furnishing "the only shred of reason on which the rule [could] be supported." Id. at 664.
See also McCormick, supra note 19, § 38.
23. Who is one's own witness? See 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, 44 909-18. See also
O'Neil v. Stratton, 64 F.2d 911, 912 (8th Cir. 1933); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (amended 1970);
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-705 (Repl. 1962) (repealed 1976 and superseded by Ark. Uniform R. Evid.
611(c)).
24. McCormick, supra note 19, § 38; 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 903 at 672. The
fear that impeachment testimony will be given substantive effect is pervasive in decisions
surrounding the adoption of Rule 607. See, e.g., United States v. Palacios, 556 F.2d 1359 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918
(1977); United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Morlang, 531
F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975).
25. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-706 (Repl. 1962) (repealed 1976 and superseded by Ark. Uni-
form R. Evid. 607); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 621-625 (Repl. 1976); Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-1726, -
1727 (Burns Repl. 1946); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1642 (1973); Va. Code § 8.01-403 (1950).
See also 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 905.
26. Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 44 (1853) (excluded prior inconsistent statement if of.
fered by extrinsic evidence, but allowed testimony if elicited from witness himself); Babcock
v. People, 13 Colo. 515, 520, 22 P. 817, 818-19 (1889) (excluded all prior inconsistent state-
ments as such but allowed witness to be questioned about former statement for purpose of
stimulating the witness' recollection and inducing him to make a correction); Hull v. State,
93 Ind. 128, 134 (1883); Dunlap v. Richardson, 63 Miss. 447 (1886) (if party is deceived or
misled); Dunn v. Dunnaker, 87 Mo. 597 (1885) (if party entrapped); Sturgis v. State, 2 Okla.
Crim. 362, 390-92, 102 P. 57, 67-68 (1909) (surprise at and injury from testimony in the
discretion of trial court); Langford v. Jones, 18 Or. 307, 327, 22 P. 1064, 1071 (1890) (certain
class of prior inconsistent statement excluded on the ground that they were not truly contra-
dictory, but instead served to introduce flagrant hearsay. For example, witness X testifies
that he knows nothing of an assault, the rule would prohibit admission of the witness' former
statement describing the assault in detail).
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self-contradiction evidence.
In Arkansas a statute was enacted in 1947 which clearly permit-
ted the party producing a witness to show that the witness had made
prior inconsistent statements.Y However, the Arkansas Supreme
Court interjected limitations of surprise 8 and positive harm to the
party's case 2 as conditions to impeachment. These limitations were
consistent with prior judicial holdings30 on the subject, but they
were difficult to work with. For example, if an attorney interviewed
a potentially recalcitrant witness in advance of trial and learned
that the witness was not going to adhere to his original story, he
could not in good faith represent to the trial court that he was
"surprised" by the testimony3' or state that the testimony
"harmed" his case. 32 Furthermore, the rule could prevent a party
from receiving the benefit of a witness' story on all points except
those dealing with the contradiction.Y
The federal system relaxed the orthodox rule by permitting
impeachment of compulsory witnesses, ' government agents called
27. The statute read as follows:
Impeaching own witness. -The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach
his credit, by evidence of bad character, unless it is in a case in which it was
indispensable that the party should produce him; but he may contradict him by
other evidence, and by showing that he has made statements different from his
present testimony.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-706 (Repl. 1962) (repealed 1976 and superseded by Ark. Uniform R. Evid.
607) (emphasis added). The discretionary aspects of this statute explain the judicial limita-
tions which followed.
28. Henderson v. State, 255 Ark. 870, 503 S.W.2d 889 (1974) (a statement by counsel
that he was surprised seemed sufficient); Hill v. State, 253 Ark. 512, 487 S.W.2d 624 (1972);
Nagel v. State, 179 Ark. 625, 17 S.W.2d 317 (1929).
29. Smith v. Thomason, 229 Ark. 889, 318 S.W.2d 814 (1958); Milum v. Clark, 225 Ark.
1040, 287 S.W.2d 460 (1956) (testimony must be damaging to party and failure to give helpful
testimony which was expected is insufficient); Field, A Code of Evidence for Arkansas?, 29
Ark. L. Rev. 1, 26-27 (1975); Special Evidence Edition- Witnesses, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 229, 281
(1973).
30. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Sullivan, 197 Ark. 360, 122 S.W.2d 947 (1938); Williams v.
State, 184 Ark. 622, 43 S.W.2d 731 (1931); Garrison v. State, 148 Ark. 370, 230 S.W. 4 (1921);
Doran v. State, 141 Ark. 442, 217 S.W. 485 (1920); Jonesboro, Lake City & E. R.R. Co. v.
Gainer, 112 Ark. 477, 481, 166 S.W. 571, 573 (1914).
31. Nagel v. State, 179 Ark. 625, 629, 17 S.W.2d 317, 318 (1929).
32. Milum v. Clark, 225 Ark. 1040, 1042, 287 S.W.2d 460, 462 (1956); 3A J. Wigmore,
supra note 7, § 904 at 674.
33. See McCormick, supra note 19, § 38, in which the authors stated prior to the
enactment of Rule 607 that
[wihile the power to attack the character of one's own witness may be of little
practical value to the attacker, and is of little moment to the administration of
justice, a rule against the showing of the prior statements of one's own witness, to
aid in evaluating his testimony, is a serious obstruction to the ascertainment of
truth.
Id. at 77.
34. Stevens v. United States, 256 F.2d 619, 622-23 (9th Cir. 1958).
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by defendants in criminal cases," adverse parties in civil cases,36
ordinary witnesses in civil cases based on their depositions,37 wit-
nesses called by the court,38 and witnesses whose testimony sur-
prised the calling party and caused injury to his case.39 The rule was
further circumvented in the federal system by permitting a party to
bring out damaging matter about a witness on direct examination, 0
by allowing the accuracy of a witness' testimony to be contradicted
by extrinsic evidence," and by placing the impeaching evidence
before the jury during the process of refreshing the witness' recollec-
tion.4"
The variety of attitudes in different jurisdictions and the nu-
merous attempts to skirt the rule tended to produce confusion and
uncertainty. The logical remedy was to abolish the rule subject to
limitations of prejudice and probative value. This result has been
accomplished by the passage of Rule 60741 which provides that a
witness' credibility "may be attacked by any party, including the
party calling him."
2. Modern Application of Rule 607
Both the Arkansas Rules and the Federal Rules expand the
scope of admissibility in all phases of evidence and emphasize the
need for relevant evidence that will elicit the true facts in a given
proceeding. 4 Consequently, trial courts should discard all prior no-
tions concerning impeachment of one's own witness by prior self-
35. United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347, 351 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
958 (1963). The Second Circuit appears to have been the only circuit following this rule.
36. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(b).
37. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(1).
38. United States v. Browne, 313 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
814 (1963).
39. Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 759 (8th Cir. 1967); London Guar. & Acc.
Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F.2d 325, 334 (8th Cir. 1936).
40. United States v. Rothman, 463 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
956 (1972).
41. United States v. Williamson, 424 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Freeman, 302 F.2d 347, 351 (2d Cir. 1962).
42. Lerma v. United States, 387 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
907 (1968); Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303 (1894). See McCormick, supra note 19, §
38 at 77. But see Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1967).
43. See note 4 supra.
44. See Fed. R. Evid. 102, 401, 402 (broad definition and general admissibility of rele-
vant evidence), 607 (impeachment of any witness by any party), 701 (admissibility of lay
witness opinion testimony expanded), 703, 705 (admissibility of expert opinion without need
for hypothetical based upon facts in evidence), 801(d)(expanded area of nonhearsay), 803




contradiction and should approach the new rule in a way that will
promote the discovery of whether a witness is telling the truth .
5
Rules concerning the mechanics of impeaching a witness by
prior inconsistent statements have been established." Before extrin-
sic evidence is offered, the witness must be asked whether he made
the statement and must be given an opportunity to explain or deny
the contradiction.47 In addition, the opposite party must be given
the opportunity to interrogate the witness concerning the state-
ment.4 8 The examining attorney does not need to exhibit the state-
ment or to disclose the statement's content to the witness at the
time of examination, but upon request he must show or disclose the
statement to opposing counsel."
Evidence offered for purposes of impeachment should be con-
sidered by the trial judge in light of Rules 40110 and 40351 of the
Federal and Arkansas Rules. The question should be whether the
probative value of the prior inconsistent statement outweighs the
danger of prejudice," not whether the proponent of the witness was
surprised and harmed by the testimony.5 3 Such an approach is in
45. 3 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 607[02] at 607-15. But see Graham,
Examination of a Party's Own Witness Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Promise
Unfulfilled, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 917 (1976) (the author suggests that common law restrictions of
surprise and damage be applied to government impeachment of its own witness under Rule
607).
46. Fed. R. Evid. 613; Ark. Uniform R. Evid. 613; 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 906
at 693.
47. Fed. R. Evid. 613(b); Ark. Uniform R. Evid. 613(b). This requirement, however,
does not apply to admissions of a party opponent as defined in Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) and
Ark. Uniform R. Evid. 801(d)(2).See, e.g., Johnson v. Daniels, 221 Ark. 276, 254 S.W.2d 946
(1952). In spite of the rule's clarity, the court in United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 255-
56 (1st Cir. 1976) stated that the foundation requirements were "good practice ... but not
absolutely required." The defendant's conviction was vacated.
48. Fed. R. Evid. 613(b); Ark. Uniform R. Evid. 613(b).
49. Fed. R. Evid. 613(a); Ark. Uniform R. Evid. 613(a). This Rule abolished the rule
in The Queen's Case, 2 Br & B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820), which contained a requirement
that before a cross-examiner could question a witness about a prior written statement, he
must first show the statement to the witness. See Advisory Committee notes to Fed. R. Evid.
607, 28 U.S.C. app. (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
50. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401, Ark. Uniform R. Evid.
401.
51. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403; Ark. Uniform R. Evid. 403.
52. The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 403 state that .'[u]nfair prejudice' within
its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one." 28 U.S.C. app. at 2322 (Supp. V 1975).
53. 3 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 607[02]. In interpreting Rule 607, five
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harmony with the expanded discretion objectives implicit in both
sets of rules.54 In addition, this approach would abrogate the
"collateral matter" rule as it is mechanically applied and would
significantly reduce the confusion created by many of the artificial
rules and limitations heretofore applied in those situations involving
impeachment by prior inconsistent statements.55 One can only hope
that state and federal courts will take advantage of the opportunity
to develop a fresh approach to an area of law which has been filled
with contradictions and confusion.
3. Prior Inconsistent Statements-Substantive Evidence of Facts
Stated?
The traditional rule was that a prior inconsistent statement of
a witness was hearsay" and inadmissible to prove the truth of the
United States Courts of Appeals have suggested or expressly held that a showing of surprise
is unnecessary. United States v. Palacios, 556 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 495 n.6 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 189
n.14, 193 (4th Cir. 1975)(dissenting opinion)(see note 54 infra); United States v. Harris, 523
F.2d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Jordano, 521 F.2d 695, 697 (2d Cir. 1975) (court
ruled, in a pre-Federal Rules case, that "[surprise, if a necessary element for impeachment,
• . . was a very modest element . . . and was not to be construed as synonymous with
amazement"). See also United States v. Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1977) (finding of
hostility no longer a prerequisite for impeachment by a party of its own witness). But see
United States v. Long Soldier, 562 F.2d 601, 605 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977)(court ruled that surprise
was no longer a viable requirement for impeachment of one's own witness but a party offering
grand jury testimony for purposes of impeachment must show that the trial testimony was
inconsistent and "harmful" to his case).
54. Such an approach would have been helpful in United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d
183 (4th Cir. 1975), because the court was concerned with the relevancy of the impeachment
testimony, its prejudicial and confusing nature, and the fact that the testimony, as presented,
was untrustworthy. The court stated that the opinion would be of "limited precedential
value" since the case was tried after the Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evidence were adopted
but before they were put into effect. The majority refused to apply the new rules in the case.
Id. at 189 n.14. The best approach would seem to be accomplished by balancing the testi-
mony's probative value with its prejudicial effect. The trial judge is in the best position to
do so since it is he who sees the witness and hears the testimony. An analogous position has
been adopted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in connection with the receipt of similar
transaction evidence offered pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). See, e.g., United States v.
Maestas, 554 F.2d 834 (8th Cir. 1977). Failure to use the balancing approach suggested by
Rule 403 results in confusion. See, e.g., United States v. Long Soldier, 562 F.2d 601, 605 n.3
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Davis, 551 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rogers,
549 F.2d 490, 502-06 (8th Cir. 1976)(dissenting opinion).
55. See 3 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 607[02], which Judge Weinstein
states that "[tihe main consequence of recasting credibility in terms of relevancy would
probably be better analyses of the proffered evidence by both counsel and court." See also
Matkin v. Jones, 260 Ark. 731, 543 S.W.2d 764 (1976)(defines "collateral matter"); 3 Wein-
stein's Evidence, supra note 12, §§ 607[05], [06] (discussion of "collateral matters").
56. 3 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 607[061; 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, §
1018 at 995-96; Beaver & Biggs, Attending Witnesses Prior Declarations As Evidence: Theory
v. Reality, 3 Ind. Leg. Forum 309 (1970).
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matter stated unless the prior statement fell within one of the excep-
tions to the hearsay rule. 57 Hence, the prior inconsistent statement
was only admitted for purposes of attacking the credibility of the
witness. 5 The orthodox view was based primarily upon the premise
that the prior statement was untrustworthy because it rested upon
the credit of a declarant who was not under oath when the statement
was made.59 However, as the law developed, cross-examination
began to replace the oath as the principal safeguard of the trustwor-
thiness of testimony. 0 Consequently, the legal scholars began to
advocate the total elimination of the orthodox rule in cases involv-
ing prior inconsistent statements when it was the witness' own
statement upon which he was being cross-examined.' Similarly,
some courts began to shape a new view of the rule against substan-
tive use of prior inconsistent statements.
2
a. Federal Law
The United States Supreme Court proposed the codification of
a rule 3 which would have permitted all prior inconsistent state-
57. McCormick, supra note 19, § 251 at 601. The Federal Rules list exceptions to the
hearsay rule which have been interpreted by the courts. See United States v. Cline, 570 F.2d
Adv. Sh. 731 (8th Cir. 1978) (prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence under Rule
801(d)(2)(A) as an admission of a party-opponent); Joyner v. United States, 547 F.2d 1199
(4th Cir. 1977) (prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)
because evidence showed a conspiracy (even though not charged), and the statements were
made by co-conspirators pursuant to the conspiracy); United States v. Porter, 544 F.2d 936
(8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976)(prior inconsistent state-
ments admitted as substantive evidence under Rule 803(24)). The court in Leslie cited as
support for its position Judge Weinstein's opinion in United States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977), in which he discusses the application of
Federal Rule 803(24) in detail. Id. at 290. See also Graham, supra note 45, at 966-72.
58. United States v. Tavares, 512 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bensinger,
430 F.2d 584, 595 (8th Cir. 1970); Thompson v. State, 207 Ark. 680, 182 S.W.2d 386 (1944).
59. McCormick, supra note 19, § 251 at 601. In addition to the absence of the oath, the
declarant was not, at the time the statement was made, subject to cross-examination or in
the presence of the trier of fact. Id.
60. Id. at 601-02.
61. Id. at 603-04; 3 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 607[06] at 607-58 (agrees
with Wigmore); 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 1018 at 996; McCormick, The Turncoat
Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 Tex. L. Rev. 573 (1947).
62. Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); see Taylor v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R., 344 F.2d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965); United States v. De
Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964). De Sisto and Taylor
appear to have laid the foundation for Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules. See also United
States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1976); cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1977).
63. Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183, 293 (1973). The proposed rule provided that "[a] statement is not hearsay if... [tihe
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is . . . inconsistent with his testimony .... " The Supreme
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ments to be admissible as substantive evidence." After an attempt
by the House Judiciary Committee to alter the rule drastically,
Congress compromised 5 and adopted Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Fed-
eral Rules6 which provides that
[a] statement is not hearsay if . .. [t]he declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement, and the statement is . . . inconsistent with his
testimony, and given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury
at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition.
The Rule applies in both civil and criminal cases, but if the
prior inconsistent statement does not meet certain requirements, it
may not be admitted as substantive evidence. 7 It is difficult to
prove that a specific sworn statement falls within the scope of Rule
801(d)(1)(A) and thus meets the requirements of inconsistency, rel-
evancy, and constitutionality. Although these requirements were
"founded in fundamental fairness,"6 there are some problems that
arise because of them. It is therefore necessary to discuss the specific
requirements and limitations of the Rule.
(1) Inconsistency
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) requires first that the statements be incon-
Court Advisory Committee felt that the requirements of inconsistency and cross-examination
would foreclose any general and indiscriminate use of previously prepared statements at trial.
64. The Supreme Court's proposed rule was held constitutional in California v. Greene,
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
65. The House Judiciary Committee altered proposed rule 801(d)(1)(A) by adding a
requirement that the prior inconsistent statement must have been subject to cross-
examination. H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1973] U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 7086-87. However, the Senate Committee recommended reinstatement of the rule
as proposed by the United States Supreme Court. S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7062-63. In response to the difference of
opinion the House Conference Committee adopted a compromise allowing prior inconsistent
statements to be used as substantive evidence when the statement was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a "proceeding" or in a deposition. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. Cong. Code & Ad. News 7103-04. An in-depth
discussion of the legislative history of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) can be found in 4 Weinstein's Evi-
dence, supra note 12, at 801-4.7 to -27.
66. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). Blakey, Substantive Use of Prior Inconsistent State-
ments Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 64 Ky. L.J. 3 (1976).
67. United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
983 (1977); United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975)(witness' grand jury testi-
mony could not be introduced as substantive evidence where trial testimony was not incon-
sistent; court observed that this ruling would have been the same had Rule 801(d)(1)(A) been
applied). General Communications Eng'r, Inc. v. Motorola Communications and Elec., Inc.,
421 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Cal. 1976)(affidavit not under oath inadmissible as substantive
evidence).
68. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1976).
1978] IMPEACHMENT 287
sistent. In United States v. Rogers9 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in a split decision,70 ruled that "[a] statement's inconsis-
tency may be determined from the circumstances and is not limited
to cases in which diametrically opposite assertions have been
made."71 The court in Rogers stated further that "inconsistencies
may be found in changes of position; they may be implied through
silence; and they may also be found in denial of recollection."7
Similarly, in United States v. Cline73 the Eighth Circuit held that
if a witness on cross-examination "denies making the statement, or
has failed to remember it, the making of the statement may be
proved by another witness."74 One might ask whether an inconsis-
tency exists when a witness has a slight loss of memory at the time
of the trial on matters about which he formerly made a statement.
According to Cline, the answer is yes.75 If, however, a witness denies
all recollection of the matter in question, a problem regarding the
existence of an inconsistent statement arises. At common law the
failure of recollection was not considered to be inconsistent with the
prior statement, and the statement could not be used for purposes
of impeachment.7" Wigmore, however, rejected this common law
rule of strict exclusion and suggested that the trial court should be
69. Id.
70. Judge Webster, who was appointed Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
on February 24, 1978, wrote the majority opinion; Chief Judge Gibson concurred; Judge Lay
dissented.
71. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1976). Originally, two principal
and conflicting tests were proposed. The first required the inconsistency to be apparent on
the face of the two statements. The prior statement was excluded unless the only inference
was one of inconsistency. The second test allowed the circumstances surrounding each state-
ment to be taken into consideration and the prior statement received into evidence as long
as inconsistency could be one of several possible inferences. 3 Weinstein's Evidence, supra
note 12, § 607[06] (1976).
72. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1976). See also United States
v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976). In Barrett the court vacated defendant's conviction
on the basis of the court's failure to permit defense impeachment of a key government
witness. The court stated the following:
[Tihe contradiction need not be in plain terms [in order for it to be admitted as
a prior inconsistent statement]. It is enough if the proffered testimony, taken as a
whole, either by what it says or by what it omits to say, affords some indication
that the fact was different from the testimony of the witness whom it is sought to
contradict.
Id. at 254.
73. 570 F.2d Adv. Sh. 731 (8th Cir. 1978). Although US. v. Cline does not deal with
impeaching one's own witness, it does address the problem of defining an inconsistency.
74. Id. at 735 (quoting McCormick, supra note 19, § 34).
75. Id.
76. California v. Greene, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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given the discretion to permit impeachment if the situation called
for it."
Judge Weinstein states that the Federal Rules support Wig-
more's approach"5 because Rule 401,11 defining relevancy in broad
terms, and Rule 403,o granting the judge discretion to exclude pre-
judicial relevant material, seem to undercut the application of the
common law rule. It therefore seems that the Federal Rules give a
judge the discretion to admit a former statement concerning an
event about which the witness in court denies any recollection.
Judge Weinstein further suggests that when the judge is deciding
whether to admit the statement, he should consider (1) the availa-
bility of other evidence; (2) the extent to which the specific witness'
credibility is critical to the case; (3) the length of time between the
underlying event and the witness' testimony; (4) the type of extrin-
sic evidence required to prove the prior inconsistent statement; and
(5) any other factors which may affect the probative value of the
extrinsic evidence or relate to the dangers specified in Rule 403
(prejudice, confusion, and waste of time) .8 Additionally, the judge
may be faced with constitutional considerations in criminal cases
when impeachment evidence of this nature is offered because a
defendant may be unable to cross-examine a witness who claims not
to remember.
8 1
If a witness claims that he is unable to remember, but does not
deny that the previous statements were in fact made, the trial judge
can infer that the claim of faulty memory is inconsistent with his
prior statements.83 Professor Wigmore points out that an "unwilling
witness often takes refuge in a failure to remember, and the astute
liar is sometimes impregnable unless his flank can be exposed to an
attack of this sort." 84 It would therefore be prudent for the trial
judge, in a situation involving a lack of memory, to make a determi-
77. 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 1043 at 1059-61. See also McCormick, supra note
19, § 251 at 604.
78. 3 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 607[06] at 607-66 to -67. See United
States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
79. The relevant language is quoted in note 50 supra.
80. The relevant language is quoted in note 51 supra.
81. 3 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 607[06] at 607-67 to -68.
82. California v. Greene, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). In Greene the Supreme Court suggested
that the use of extrinsic evidence under circumstances of memory lapse may run afoul of the
confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. Id. at 167-68.
83. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1976); see United States v.
Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636, 643 (6th Cir. 1977)(trial court could have found that witness' lack of
memory was so selective as to be incredible; impeachment by prior oral statements would
have been proper; conviction reversed on due process grounds).
84. 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 1043 at 1061.
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nation for the record that he found, under the circumstances of the
case, that the witness' failure to remember was not genuine.5
Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger support the view that a
prior statement should be admitted "whenever a reasonable man
could infer on comparing the whole effect of the two statements that
they had been produced by inconsistent beliefs." 6 The trial judge
who observes the witness and hears his testimony should therefore
have broad discretion to determine whether the answers given are
inconsistent with prior extrajudicial assertions. 7 Moreover, a case-
by-case approach should be employed by a lower court when at-
tempting to resolve the issue of inconsistency, and the appellate




Implicit in Rule 801(d)(1)(A), as well as in Rule 607 is a second
requirement that the prior inconsistent statement be related to a
matter of such relevancy that the proponent's case will be harmed
85. United States v. Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 1376, 1380 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) (conviction
reversed, however, for failure on the part of the trial judge to instruct the jury adequately on
the defense of alibi and the limited use of the impeaching testimony). See also United States
v. Rogers, 549 F.2d. 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1976).
86. 4 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 801(d)(1)(A)[01] at 801-76.
87. United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1977). The court stated that "trial
judges must retain a high degree of flexibility in deciding the exact point at which a prior
statement is sufficiently inconsistent with a witness' trial testimony to permit its use in
evidence." Id. at 242. See also United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1976). A
lapse of memory is not the only inconsistency problem trial judges face. For example, when
a witness testifies at trial to specific inculpatory facts about plaintiff but has previously made
a broad assertion that plaintiff was not at fault, two issues surface as follows: (1) is the prior
statement inconsistent for impeachment purposes, and (2) if the prior statement is inconsist-
ent, is it an inadmissible opinion? The opinion rules would probably foreclose an opinion
objection if the proper foundation were laid. See Fed. R. Evid. 701, 704. The inconsistency
problem should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Rule 401 (broad rule of
relevancy) and Rule 403 (judicial discretion to balance probative value versus prejudicial
effect) with a view toward admission if the statements were of value to the jury in evaluating
the witness' testimony. Cf. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Eddins, 177 F.2d 954, 958 (4th Cir.
1949)(expression of an opinion made when in possession of only part of the facts was not
inconsistent with his testimony as to all of the facts). See also Grady, The Admissibility of a
Prior Statement of Opinion for Purposes of Impeachment, 41 Cornell L.Q. 224 (1956). Another
problem surfaces when a witness testifies to the existence of a particular fact after failing to
assert a fact which would have been natural for him to affirm. Should the failure to make an
assertion be admissible as a prior inconsistent statement? Pre-Federal Rules decisions indi-
cated that it should be admitted unless the inference to be drawn relates to a defendant's
failure to testify when it would have been natural to do so. See, e.g., Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965); United States v. Cordova, 421 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 941 (1970); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1963).
88. United States v. Moss, 544 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077
(1977).
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if the inconsistent testimony goes unimpeached. 9 Again, the trial
judge must assess the prior inconsistent statement's admissibility
in terms of Rule 4010 (relevancy) and use the balancing approach
embodied in Rule 4031' (prejudicial v. probative).2 In deciding
whether the inconsistent statement should be admitted, the judge
should consider (1) the significance of the witness' testimony; (2)
the importance of the credibility issue; (3) the presence of other
testimony on the same point; (4) the witness' relationship to the
party; (5) the nature of the prior inconsistent statement and its
potential effect on the jury;93 and (6) any other factors which would
aid him in his determination of whether the probative value of the
impeaching testimony outweighs the dangers of prejudice.' The
judge must disallow any extrajudicial statements that are offered to
impeach testimony collateral to the issues in a case if related state-
ments damaging to the defendant are brought before the jury in the
process.95
(3) "Under Oath Subject to the Penalty of Perjury at a Trial,
Hearing, Other Proceeding, or in a Deposition"
Another condition for admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is
that the prior statement be "given under oath subject to the penalty
of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposi-
tion"."
A federal statute enacted in 1976 permits unsworn declarations
made under the penalty of perjury to be used whenever the law
requires any matter to be "supported, evidenced, established or
proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certificate, statement,
oath, or affidavit in writing of the person making the same."" Nev-
89. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1976).
90. The relevant language is quoted in note 50 supra.
91. The relevant language is quoted in note 51 supra.
92. 2 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 607[06] at 607-71.
93. Id.
94. See United States v. Puco, 436 F.2d 761, 762 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
844 (1973); Macklin v. United States, 410 F.2d 1046, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
95. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496-97 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 1973); Bushaw v. United States, 353 F.2d 477, 481
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966) (impeachment should not be used as a
subterfuge to place otherwise inadmissible hearsay before the jury). The remedy for question-
ing a witness about an irrelevant (collateral) prior inconsistency is that the examiner must
take the witness' answer and may not prove the making of the statement by extrinsic evi-
dence. See Cwach v. United States, 212 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1954); Shanahan v. Southern Pac.
Co., 188 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1951).
96. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (1976).
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ertheless, an unsworn assertion given under penalty of perjury may
not be substituted for a deposition, a document required to be exe-
cuted before a specific official other than a notary public, or an
official oath. 8 Therefore, excluding these declarations, statements
made under the penalty of perjury are synonymous with statements
made under oath for the purposes of Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
At the present time, the federal perjury statute99 deals with
perjury in general before a court""9 and has been held to cover a
witness' testimony before a grand jury. 0' Also, specific federal stat-
utes prohibit the making of false declarations before a grand jury'02
and the making of any false statements in any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.
03
Both false statement statutes are graded, as far as sentencing is
concerned, in substantially the same fashion as the perjury statutes.
The courts, however, have narrowly interpreted the latter to cover
only incidents that occur within a department or agency of the
United States. 04 This approach is based on the theory that a broad
interpretation of the statute would lead to an obliteration of the
98. 4 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 801(d)(1)(A)[01] at 801-73.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976).
100. The statute states the following:
Whoever-
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in
any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,
that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and con-
trary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of
perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully
subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty
of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined not
more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is
applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the
United States.
Id.
101. United States v. Gross, 511 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924
(1975).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976). But see United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973) (the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621 and 1623
is not clear on whether Congress intended to replace § 1621, as it relates to grand jury
testimony, with § 1623).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
104. Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967)(knowingly false oral state-
ments to F.B.I. agents not covered by § 1001). See generally Annot., 1 ALR Fed. 370 (1969).
The proposed federal Criminal Code Reform Act, S. 1437, H.R. 2311, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §
1343 (1977) would, however, make it a criminal offense to make a materially false statement
to a law enforcement officer knowingly in a government matter where the statement is volun-
teered or made after the person has been advised that making such a statement is an offense.
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distinction between false statements and perjury.' 5
The distinctions between perjury and false declarations are
important, however, if the provisions of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) are to be
interpreted literally. The House Subcommittee amended Rule
801(d)(1)(A) to require that the inconsistent prior statement be
"given under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial or
hearing or in a deposition or before a grand jury."''0 This amend-
ment encompassed proceedings included within the provisions of
the federal perjury statute.' 7 The language of the amendment was
more descriptive than restrictive because it related to the fact that
the prior statement must have been subject to cross-examination
unless made before a grand jury. The Rule, as adopted, however,
dropped the requirement that the prior statement be subject to
cross-examination but added a provision allowing prior inconsistent
statements made under oath "subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding" to fall within the Rule. 0 Since
Rule 801(d)(1) (A) expressly exempts such statements from the defi-
nition of hearsay, these statements may be given substantive effect.
The courts have not had much trouble applying the Rule to
testimony given at a preliminary hearing,'09 testimony given before
a grand jury,"0° or testimony given at a prior trial."' Judge Weinstein
takes the position that "[tihe phrase 'at a trial or hearing or in a
deposition' in Rule 801(d)(1)(A) should be broadly interpreted to
include situations which involve some kind of judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding."1 2 He suggests that testimony given before an
administrative board should be handled by the courts as a
"hearing.""1' 3 Furthermore, he maintains that administrative hear-
105. Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 1967).
106. 4 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, at 801-4.8.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976).
108. 4 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, at 801-24 to -25 (1977).
109. United States v. Plum, 558 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1977).
110. United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1977)(grand jury testimony of
accomplice witness identifying defendant as marijuana supplier admissible as substantive
evidence); United States v. Long Soldier, 562 F.2d 601, 605 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Mosley, 555 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. Adv. Sh. 163 (1977); United
States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1977); See also United States v. Champion Int'l
Corp., 557 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. Adv. Sh. 428 (1977) (grand jury
testimony admissible as substantive evidence even though some of the testimony has been
elicited by means of leading questions); United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir.
1976)(court held that had Rule 801(d)(1)(A) been in effect at the time of trial, it would have
clearly sanctioned use of grand jury testimony).
111. United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939
(1976).




ings and the like, although not classified as judicial proceedings,"4
are arguably covered by the phrase "other proceeding" depending
upon their formality." '5 The question of whether the testimony given
at a "hearing" or "other proceeding" qualifies for substantive effect
depends on whether it was made "under oath and subject to the
penalty of perjury."
The Ninth Circuit addressed the question of what constitutes
an "other proceeding" in United States v. Castro-Ayon. "8 -The court
held that sworn tape recorded statements given by three aliens to a
Border Patrol agent during an "immigration interrogation" could be
given substantive value after the aliens testified inconsistently. The
court reasoned that the "immigration interrogation" was an "other
proceeding" within the meaning of the Rule since the interrogation
was similar, in many respects, to a grand jury proceeding."7 The
holding in Castro-Ayon, however, ignores the "penalty of perjury"
issue and turns upon the extreme reliability of the prior statements.
This highlights the question of whether the courts will be persuaded
to interpret "penalty of perjury" as including statements given
under oath and subject to false declaration penalties."' If the courts
refuse to use this interpretation, Federal Rule 803(24)1" could be
used to give substantive effect to highly reliable prior inconsistent
statements. This course of action might be preferable to asking the
court to overlook the plain language of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) in order
to achieve a desired result.
Almost a year after Castro-Ayon, the Eighth Circuit in United
114. United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055, 1058 n.6 (9th Cir. 1976).
115. 4 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 801(d)(1)(A)[01].
116. 537 F.2d 1055, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1976).
117. United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1976). The court
limited its holding, however, by stating that, "[wle do not hold, as the question is not before
us, that every sworn statement given during a police station interrogation would be admissi-
ble" as substantive evidence. Id. at 1058.
118. See United States v. Gross, 511 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924
(1975), in which the court considered a similar issue.
119. Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) states that
a statement would not be excluded by the hearsay rule if it were a statement not
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently
in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportun-
ity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of
it, including the name and address of the declarant.
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States v. Mosley 2" was asked to decide whether the court was cor-
rect in admitting as substantive evidence a sworn tape recorded
statement made by a witness to a state prosecuting attorney. The
recorded statement was admitted along with portions of the witness'
grand jury testimony. The defense contended that the sworn state-
ment was not covered by Rule 801(d)(1)(A) because under Arkansas
law a false statement made under oath to a state prosecutor is not
subject to the penalty of perjury but to the penalty of false swear-
ing. "' The Court of Appeals side-stepped the issue by holding that
the statements were substantially the same as the witness' grand
jury testimony which could have been admitted under Rule
801(d)(1)(A) as statements made at an "other proceeding.' 122 The
court stated that the statements were not so prejudicial as to man-
date a new trial and therefore postponed deciding whether a sworn
statement subject only to the penalty of false swearing should be
treated as a sworn statement subjec to the penalty of perjury under
Rule 801(d)(1)(A). 23
(4). Constitutional Impediments
The fourth requirement of Rule 801(d) (1) (A) is that the declar-
ant testify at the trial or hearing and be "subject to cross-
examination." Most constitutional objections flowing from the use
of prior inconsistent statements concern the claim that the defen-
dant was denied his sixth amendment right of confrontation 4 and
that the use of the prior statements in the presence of the jury
violated the defendant's right to a fair trial.
2 5
An inability to cross-examine can occur when the witness
120. 555 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1977).
121. Id. at 193. The Mosley case was tried in January 1977. The witness gave the
statement to the state prosecutor on September 17, 1976, and should have been subject to
the perjury provisions of the Arkansas Criminal Code, which became effective on January 1,
1976. See Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2601 (2) & (4), -2602 (Repl. 1977). See also Gill v. State, 242
Ark. 797, 416 S.W.2d 269 (1967) (prosecuting attorney is a quasi-judicial officer and takes
the place of a grand jury in determining probable cause to proceed against an accused); Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 43-801 (Repl. 1977)(giving authority to prosecuting attorneys to administer oath
and take testimony of witnesses).
122. United States v. Mosley, 555 F.2d 191, 193 (8th Cir. 1977)(citing United States v.
Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1976)).
123. United States v. Mosley, 555 F.2d 191, 193 (8th Cir. 1977).
124. U.S. Const. amend. VI. See California v. Greene, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). The four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution makes the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment obligatory upon the states. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965);
McCormick, supra note 19, § 252.
125. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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refuses to testify'26 or invokes his privilege against self-
incrimination.'27 This inability can deprive the defendant of his
right of confrontation unless it was the result of "the suggestion,
procurement or act of the accused."'2 8 However, the courts have
uniformly held that the admission of extrinsic evidence under an
exception to the hearsay rule does not violate a defendant's right of
confrontation. '
The Eighth Circuit has taken the position that "[t]he relevant
factual inquiry is whether, under the circumstances, the unavaila-
bility of the declarant for cross-examination deprived the jury of a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the extrajudicial decla-
ration.' 30 The goal of the confrontation clause is to "advance a
practical concern for the accuracy-of the truth-determining process
in criminal trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfac-
tory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.' ""131 This
has been construed by the Eighth Circuit as requiring a case-by-case
analysis considering the "extent to which the declarant is available
to testify and be subject to cross-examination" and the "degree of
prejudice to the fact-finding process resulting from the declarant's
partial availability [memory lapse] or nonavailability. ' '32 In deter-
mining the degree of prejudice, the court
must consider, inter alia, whether the jury had an opportunity to
weigh the credibility of the extrajudicial statement, whether the
extrajudicial statement was crucial to the government's case, and,
if the statement's use before the jury was limited by the trial judge,
whether limiting instructions were given which were sufficient
under all the circumstances to protect the defendant from imper-
missible reliance upon the statement by the jury.'
33
Once the proponent of the prior inconsistent statement over-
comes the confrontation issue, he must face the question of whether
126. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914
(1977).
127. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965).
128. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900); See United States v. Carlson,
547 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1976)(grand jury testimony properly admitted as substantive
evidence under Rule 804(b)(5) without sixth amendment infringements where defendant
intimidated witness into refusing to testify).
129. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1356 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 730 (2d Cir. 1965).
130. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 499 (8th Cir. 1976).
131. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). See California v. Greene, 399 U.S. 149,
161 (1970).
132. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500 (8th Cir. 1976).
133. Id.
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the use of the statement will exceed permissible limits of fairness.
If a prior inconsistent statement is used for impeachment purposes
only, its use "must be balanced against the notions of fairness upon
which our system is based."'34 Moreover, if the prior inconsistent
statement is admitted as substantive evidence, due process require-
ments may prevent its use as the sole basis for a conviction.'35
(5) Limiting Instructions
Federal Rule 105136 provides that "[w]hen evidence which is
admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as
to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct
the jury accordingly."
Rule 105 seems to require the court to give a limiting instruc-
tion upon request when a prior inconsistent statement is used for
impeachment purposes.' 3 The court may also be required to give a
limiting instruction upon request when a prior statement is to be
used as substantive evidence.' 38 Sometimes the failure to give a
limiting instruction in the absence of a request may be plain error. 139
134. United States v. Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636, 643 (6th Cir. 1977) (recitation of the entire
substance of a witness' disavowed, unsworn prior statement abridged defendant's right to a
fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment).
135. California v. Greene, 399 U.S. 149, 163-64 n.15, 169 (1970). See 4 Weinstein's
Evidence, supra note 12, § 801(d)(1)(A)[01].
136. Fed. R. Evid. 105.
137. United States v. Porter, 544 F.2d 936, 938-39 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976); Martin v. United
States, 528 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1975). Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 548 F.2d 542 (5th Cir.
1977)(limiting instruction clearly saved case from reversal).
138. United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1232 (8th Cir. 1976). Cf. United States v.
Marchand, 564 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1977) (instruction given on substantive effect of prior in-
consistent statement).
139. Upham v. United States, 328 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1964); see United States v. Lip-
scomb, 425 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1970)(failure to instruct the jury on the limiting effect of prior
inconsistent statements held plain error where the government's evidence was weak and the
statement was extremely damaging); United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.
1964)(failure to give limiting instruction plain error when prior inconsistent statement tied
the defendant to the offense charged). See also Salde v. United States, 267 F.2d 834, 836 (5th
Cir. 1959)(inadequate instruction, therefore plain error found). But see United States v.
Alfonso, 552 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. Adv. Sh. 179 (1977)(failure to
instruct sua sponte not reversible error); United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1232 (8th
Cir. 1976)(no request made and no plain error found). Cf. United States v. Ragghianti, 560
F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1977)(failure to give limiting instruction, although not requested, consid-
ered by court in reversing conviction). See generally Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)(plain error
defined); United States v. Cole, 453 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 922
(1972) (limiting instruction not required unless specifically requested and failure to give same
not grounds for reversal unless it constitutes plain error). The limiting instruction was held
to be correct in Arkansas in the criminal case of Thompson v. State, 207 Ark. 680, 182 S.W.2d
IMPEACHMENT
The safest practice is to give the instruction, whether requested or
not, in all cases where prior inconsistent statement testimony is
received for purposes of impeachment to the detriment of an ac-
cused in a criminal case.
It is difficult to determine whether jurors can make the distinc-
tion between impeaching and substantive evidence. Furthermore, it
is possible that a juror will choose to believe the prior inconsistent
statement because it was made closer in time to the event in ques-
tion than was the witness' testimony in court.40 The limiting in-
struction attempts to give guidance to the jury in a spirit of due
process and it should be modified to fit the particular circumstances
of each case.' In order to avoid confusion,' the trial judge should
give an instruction immediately after the witness' testimony, as well
as at the end of the case.
b. Arkansas Law
Unlike the situation with respect to Rule 607, Arkansas Rule
801(d) (1)(i) differs significantly from its federal counterpart. Arkan-
sas Rule 801(d)(1)(i) provides that
[a] statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement, and the statement is . . . inconsistent with his
testimony and, if offered in a criminal proceeding, was given under
oath and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or
other proceeding, or in a deposition.
4
1
Unlike the parallel Federal Rule, the Arkansas Rule requires
that the prior inconsistent statement be given under oath subject
to the penalty of perjury only if it is offered at a criminal proceeding.
Consequently the "wide open" rule as proposed by the United
386 (1944), and in civil cases the Arkansas Supreme Court has stated that a limiting instruc-
tion on prior inconsistent statements is proper when requested. Matkin v. Jones, 260 Ark.
731, 543 S.W.2d 764 (1976)(case decided after the Arkansas Uniform Rules went into effect,
but defendant was tried, according to appellant's counsel, on April 21, 1976). See Ark. Uni-
form R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(i) on the necessity for such an instruction in civil cases under existing
law.
140. 3 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 12, § 607[06]; 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 7, §
1018.
141. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 497-98 (8th Cir. 1976).
142. An example of the confusion that might arise is found in that situation in which
two separate prior inconsistent statements are received; one to be used for impeachment and
the second to be used as substantive evidence. See United States v. Jordano, 521 F.2d 695
(2d Cir. 1975).
143. Ark. Uniform R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(i).
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States Supreme Court"' is applicable to civil cases in Arkansas. It
permits the introduction of any prior inconsistent statement as sub-
stantive evidence in a civil case. Limiting prior inconsistent testi-
mony evidence for purposes of impeachment only is therefore un-
necessary. 45
There have been no Arkansas Supreme Court decisions inter-
preting Rule 607 or the evidentiary requirements of Rule
801(d)(1)(i). Similarly, no legislative history or special committee
notes exist for the Arkansas Uniform Rules. However, according to
a member of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws' Special Committee on Evidence, the committee has
tried to reconcile Arkansas Rule 801(d)(1)(i) with Federal Rule
801(d)(1)(A) and, in the interest of protecting the rights of a defen-
dant in a criminal case, adopted the interpretation of the Federal
Rule as it applies to criminal cases. "6 In view of the identical appli-
cation of the Arkansas Rule and the Federal Rule in criminal cases,
it seems reasonable to apply the standards utilized by federal courts
when assessing inconsistency, relevancy, reliability, and constitu-
tionality. Arkansas Rules 401 (defining relevancy) and 403 (balanc-
ing probative value v. prejudicial impact) are likewise identical to
their federal counterparts, and their application to the admissibility
of prior inconsistent statements in Arkansas criminal cases should
be the same.
The legal effects of the Rule in civil cases is quite evident. The
Rule has the potential of saving an attorney from a directed verdict.
The lack of judicial decisions on the subject is surprising, but it
could be explained by the fact that years of custom and habit may
be delaying an awareness of the Rule. Nevertheless, the Rule exists
and can be used by the practitioner in a helpful manner.
The skeptics who believe that the Rule will open the door to
abuse or fraud should be reassured by the fact that a prior inconsist-
ent statement is not automatically admissible in court. In civil as
well as criminal cases, Rules 401 and 403 give the trial court consid-
erable discretion to balance all factors surrounding the making of
the prior inconsistent statement in an attempt to ascertain whether
the probative value of the evidence outweighs any danger of preju-
144. 56 F.R.D. 183, 293 (1973); see note 5 supra; see also 4 Weinstein's Evidence, supra
note 12, § 801(d)(1)[01] (discussion of the uniform rule as it was originally drafted).
145. See Joint Bd. of Cloak, Skirt & Dressmakers Union v. Senco, Inc., 310 F. Supp.
539 (D. Mass. 1970).




dice. The trial court's decision in this regard must stand unless it
is found on appeal to be an abuse of this discretion.'47
147. United States v. Moss, 544 F.2d 954, 961 (8th Cir. 1976).
